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 649 
THE DIFFICULTY OF BALANCING THE DOCTRINE OF 
PRIOR RESTRAINT WITH THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK                              
APPELLATE DIVISION, THIRD DEPARTMENT 
Porco v. Lifetime Entertainment Services, LLC1 
(decided April 17, 2014) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The public has always been curious about the lives and per-
sonalities of celebrities.2  In an effort to capitalize on this demand, 
networks seek exclusive rights to the individual’s story in order to 
produce docudramas.3  Unfortunately, docudramas may expose un-
flattering facts in dramatic detail.4  Under the assumption that “the 
life of a public figure belong[s] to the citizens,” high public demand 
has given rise to unauthorized docudramas.5  Consequently, public 
figures have sought judicial injunctions to prevent public disclosure 
of their private lives alleging a violation of their right of privacy.6  
New York State provides a narrow privacy statute to protect public 
figures from name and likeness misappropriation in the commercial 
context, which grants an injunction as an absolute right.7  However, 
when the alleged privacy violation arises from impending speech—
that is, speech that has not yet been spoken—the courts are reluctant 
to issue injunctions, correctly finding that such a sanction is an un-
 
1 984 N.Y.S.2d 457 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2014). 
2 Teri N. Hollander, Enjoining Unauthorized Biographies and Docudramas, 16 LOY. L.A. 




6 Id. at 135. 
7 See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 2009) (“Any person whose name, portrait, 
picture or voice is used within this state for advertising purposes . . . without the written con-
sent first obtained as above provided may maintain an equitable action in the supreme court 
of this state.”). 
1
Nunez: Prior Restraint with the Right of Privacy
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2015
650 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 31 
constitutional prior restraint on freedom of speech rights.8 
The doctrine of prior restraint is derived from the First 
Amendment, which prevents the government from restraining an in-
dividual’s free speech.9  Courts have interpreted the term “prior re-
straint” to be a “law, regulation or judicial order that suppresses 
speech—or provides for its suppression at the discretion of govern-
ment officials—on the basis of the speech’s content and in advance 
of its actual expression.”10  Both federal and New York State courts 
apply the same analytical framework for determining whether a pre-
liminary injunction imposed on impending speech is an unconstitu-
tional prior restraint.11  In addition, the courts apply a strict scrutiny 
standard, placing a heavy burden on the party seeking the injunction 
to prove that the scales of equity clearly balance in his or her favor.12  
  However, for an individual who has become a public figure as 
a result of participating in a highly publicized criminal trial, the anal-
ysis that New York courts undertake to determine whether to issue an 
injunction to protect that individual’s narrow privacy right while 
simultaneously trying to prevent an unconstitutional prior restraint 
can be perplexing.13  New York enacted a privacy statute in an at-
tempt to reconcile the two rights, but the statute’s vagueness has re-
sulted in conflicting interpretations and confusion.14  To provide clar-
ity, New York’s privacy statute should be amended with clear 
language to determine whether and when to issue an injunction.  Or, 
in the alternative, a court could distinguish between commercial and 
non-commercial speech when applying the analytical framework for 
a preliminary injunction to avoid diminishing a public figure’s nar-
row privacy right.  This Note will discuss the issue presented to the 
court in Porco v. Lifetime Entertainment—whether a temporary re-
straining order against a television network seeking to produce a 
movie about a citizen’s murder prosecution constituted a prior re-
straint on the freedom of speech. 
 
8 See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
9 Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 586 (1976). 
10 See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993); United States v. Quat-
trone, 402 F.3d 304, 309 (2d Cir. 2005); Ash v. Bd. of Mgrs. of 155 Condo., 843 N.Y.S.2d 
218, 219 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2007). 
11 See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
12 Id. 
13 See discussion infra Part VI.B. 
14 Id. 
2
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II. KEY FACTS 
On November 15, 2004, an ax-wielding intruder entered into 
Peter and Joan Porco’s residence in Bethlehem, New York, killing 
Peter and violently assaulting Joan.15  When investigators arrived at 
the scene, they asked Joan whether her son, Christopher Porco (“Por-
co”), had been her attacker.16  Joan was able to affirmatively nod, 
rendering Porco as the prime suspect for the attack.17 
Meanwhile, over 200 miles away at the University of Roches-
ter, Porco received a phone call from a local reporter notifying him of 
his father’s murder.18  While his mother was undergoing emergency 
surgery, Porco was taken to the Town of Bethlehem Police Depart-
ment where he repeatedly denied having anything to do with the at-
tack on his parents.19  After approximately six hours of interrogation, 
Porco was arrested for the murder of his father and the attempted 
murder of his mother.20  The police conducted a subsequent investi-
gation to prove that Porco could have left the University of Rochester 
campus to carry out the deadly attack and return before the discovery 
of his parents’ bodies.21  Although there was no forensic evidence to 
tie Porco to the crime scene, the prosecutor’s timeline of the attack 
was damaging to Porco’s defense.22 
As a result of his father’s role in the Albany legal community 
and the heinous nature of the crime, Porco requested a change of 
 
15 People v. Porco, No. 05-848, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2859, at *2 (Cnty. Ct. Albany 
County June 29, 2006). 
16 Id. 
17 Id.; see Patti Aronofsky, Katherine Davis, Elena DiFiore & Mead Stone, The Porco 
Murder: Did a College Student Take an Ax to His Parents?, Forty eight hours, CBSNEWS 
(Aug. 17, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-porco-murder-did-a-college-student-




21 The Porco Murder, supra note 17.  Porco asserted that he never left campus and was 
asleep on the fraternity couch the entire evening.  Id.  But campus security cameras and a 
surveillance camera on the roof of an on-campus medical center showed footage of a distinc-
tive yellow jeep, similar to Porco’s jeep, leaving campus.  Id.  In addition, several eyewit-
nesses claimed to have seen the distinctive yellow jeep on the highway going in the direction 
of Porco’s parents’ house.  Id.  Furthermore, Porco’s fraternity brothers testified that they did 
not see Porco asleep on the couch at all that night.  Id. 
22 The Porco Murder, supra note 17; see Robert Gavin, Porco Murder Case Holds Public 
in Thrall, TIMES UNION (Dec. 28, 2012, 7:12 AM), http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/ 
Porco-murder-case-holds-public-in-thrall-4150120.php [hereinafter Porco Murder Case]. 
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venue due to the intense pre-trial publicity.23  On June 13, 2006, Por-
co’s trial was transferred from Albany County to Orange County, 
New York.24  On December 12, 2006, after a seven-week trial and 
less than six hours of deliberation, the jury found Porco guilty of sec-
ond-degree murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment.25  Con-
sidered “the most notorious crime of the Capital Region’s history,” 
Porco’s murder trial attracted national media coverage.26  Newspaper 
articles and televised news segments were dedicated to reporting the 
unfolding events and the trial of the “ax murderer from Delmar.”27 
After Porco’s sentencing, Lifetime Entertainment Services 
(“Lifetime”) sought to broadcast a film titled, Romeo Killer: The 
Christopher Porco Story (“Romeo Killer”), based on the true story 
surrounding the murder and the subsequent criminal proceedings.28  
Upon learning of Romeo Killer, Porco sought an injunction to pre-
vent the film from airing on the ground that the use of his name in 
connection with the movie violated his privacy rights under New 
York Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 51.29  Unaware of the contents 
of the movie, Porco argued that Romeo Killer was a fictionalized ac-
count of the events leading up to his criminal trial, which required 
Lifetime to obtain his prior written consent.30  Lifetime argued that 
Romeo Killer was based on true events taken from court records, in-
terviews with witnesses, and other public documents.31  Hence, Por-
co’s prior written consent was not required because the film was de-
 
23 People v. Porco, 816 N.Y.S.2d 361 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2006). 
24 Id. 
25 People v. Porco, 896 N.Y.S.2d 161, 162 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2010).  Porco subsequent-
ly appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in permitting the detective to testify as to how 
Joan Porco affirmatively nodded when asked if Porco was her attacker.  Id.  The Appellate 
Division, Second Department, affirmed, holding that although the testimony should have 
been excluded, its admission was harmless error due to the overwhelming evidence against 
the defendant.  Id. at 163.  In addition, jurors commented that the decision to convict Porco 
had nothing to do with Joan Porco’s affirmative nod because they believed “she didn’t know 
what she was nodding to.”  The Porco Murder, supra note 17. 
26 Porco Murder Case, supra note 22. 
27 Id.  See Eriq Gardner, Judge Bans Airing of Lifetime TV’s Chris Porco Movie (Exclu-
sive), THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Mar. 20, 2013, 10:22 AM), http://www.hollywood   
reporter.com/thr-esq/lifetimes-chris-porco-movie-banned-429988 [hereinafter Judge Bans 
Airing].  The murder trial was covered in CBS’ 48 Hours Mystery and the truTV Series Fo-
rensic Files.  Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Porco v. Lifetime Entm’t Servs., 984 N.Y.S.2d 457, 458 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2014).  
For a detailed discussion of N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50 and 51, see infra Part VI.B. 
30 Porco, 984 N.Y.S.2d at 458. 
31 Judge Bans Airing, supra note 27. 
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fined as “newsworthy,” an exception to New York’s privacy statute.32 
In a shocking decision to the entertainment industry, the Clin-
ton County Supreme Court granted the temporary restraining order 
(“TRO”) against Lifetime, thus preventing the film’s impending 
broadcast.33  In applying the traditional preliminary injunction test,34 
the court was not convinced that Porco would be properly compen-
sated for an invasion of his privacy with monetary damages after the 
film’s broadcast.35  Furthermore, the court dismissed Lifetime’s ar-
gument that an injunction would be a prior restraint on speech.36  
Lifetime filed an emergency application with the Appellate Division, 
Third Department to vacate the injunction, arguing that the network 
would lose over one million dollars and the injunction would “harm 
its brand, and represent a disaster to free speech.”37 
III. THE THIRD DEPARTMENT’S DECISION AND REASONING 
The issue presented to the Appellate Division for the Third 
Department was whether the TRO granted by the Clinton County 
Court, based upon violations of New York’s privacy statute, was an 
unconstitutional prior restraint on Lifetime’s freedom of speech.38  
Porco argued that, pursuant to New York Civil Rights Law sections 
50 and 51, the use of his name in connection with Romeo Killer 
without his written consent was an invasion of his privacy.39  Further, 
he argued that the movie was a dramatized and fictionalized version 
of events leading up to his criminal trial, and therefore, did not fall 
within the statute’s newsworthy exception.40  In response, Lifetime 
argued that the film did not violate Porco’s right to privacy because it 
took all the facts from public records and interviews with eyewitness-
 
32 See discussion infra Part VI.B. 
33 Lifetime, 984 N.Y.S.2d at 458. 
34 Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Book Co., 380 N.Y.S.2d 839, 842 (Sup. Ct. 
N.Y. County 1975).  In order to grant a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show: 
(1) “the likelihood of its ultimate success on the merits; (2) that irreparable harm will occur 
absent the granting of the preliminary injunction; and (3) that a balancing of the equities in 
the case at bar mandates . . . the injunctive relief.”  Id. 
35 Judge Bans Airing, supra note 27. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Lifetime, 984 N.Y.S.2d at 458. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 459.  See also supra Part VI.B for a discussion of the newsworthy exception. 
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es, and therefore, it fell within the newsworthy exception. 41  Im-
portantly, Lifetime sought a reversal of the lower court’s ruling, argu-
ing that the TRO was a prior restraint on its First Amendment right to 
freedom of speech.42 
The Appellate Division accepted Lifetime’s argument and re-
versed the county court’s ruling.43  First, the court defined a prior re-
straint as any “law, regulation, or judicial order that suppresses 
speech . . . on the basis of speech’s content and in advance of its ac-
tual expression.”44  As the court explained, prior restraints are the 
least acceptable infringement on First Amendment rights because “a 
free society prefers to punish the few who abuse the rights of free 
speech after they break the law than to throttle them . . . before-
hand.”45  Thus, because it is difficult to determine what someone will 
say in advance, public policy prefers a wait-and-sue approach—that 
is, initiating a civil or criminal proceeding after a defendant has 
abused his or her right to freedom of speech.46 
Second, the court noted that although freedom of speech is 
not absolute, a prior restraint carries “a heavy presumption against its 
constitutional validity.”47  Only in the exceptional case, when a mov-
ing party can clearly establish that the expression in dispute will 
“immediately and irreparably create public injury,” will a court con-
sider granting an injunction.48  The court emphasized that harm to the 
plaintiff alone does not satisfy the public injury element.49  Rather, 
the plaintiff has the heavy burden of proving that the broadcast will 
create “imminent and irreversible injury” to the general public.50 
In the present case, the court found that the plaintiff failed to 
establish that the broadcast would create “imminent and irreversible 
injury” to the general public.51  The plaintiff argued that the film 
would harm him personally by invading his privacy rights, yet Ro-
meo Killer is a film depicting the facts surrounding the plaintiff’s 
 
41 See Judge Bans Airing, supra note 27. 





47 Lifetime, 984 N.Y.S.2d at 458. 
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public murder trial.52  As the court explained, broadcasting Romeo 
Killer would not lead to the kind of immediate and irreparable harm 
to the general public that would warrant an injunction because the 
movie itself is a matter of public interest.53  The court concluded that, 
while the TRO in this case constituted an unconstitutional prior re-
straint on free speech, Porco may still seek monetary damages once 
the film is broadcast if “the defendant abused its rights of speech” by 
lying or using offensive language.54  Romeo Killer was ultimately 
aired on March 23, 2013 on the Lifetime Network and was advertised 
as the “Lifetime Original Movie Chris Porco doesn’t want you to 
see.”55  
IV. THE DOCTRINE OF PRIOR RESTRAINT 
A prior restraint is any “law, regulation or judicial order that 
suppresses speech . . . on the basis of the speech’s content and in ad-
vance of its actual expression.”56  Since the inception of the Bill of 
Rights, the right to freedom of speech and the doctrine of prior re-
straint have worked hand in hand.57  The doctrine is broad and flexi-
ble in order to remain consistent with the First Amendment’s main 
purpose to prevent “all such previous restraints . . . practiced by other 
governments.”58  The two common types of prior restraints are ad-
ministrative licensing and judicial injunctions,59 which normally arise 
“in the context of the press . . . or in licensing and permit schemes for 
speech in public places.”60  In addition, prior restraint issues have 
arisen in cases involving claims of an invasion of privacy or name 
 
52 Lifetime, 984 N.Y.S.2d at 459. 
53 Id. 
54 Id.; see also CBS v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1318 (1994) (holding that “[s]ubsequent civ-
il or criminal proceedings, rather than prior restraints, ordinarily are the appropriate sanction 
for calculated defamation or other misdeeds in the First Amendment context”). 
55 Eriq Gardner, Lifetime TV Wins Appeal Over Chris Porco Movie Ban, THE 
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Apr. 18, 2014, 9:05 AM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-
esq/lifetime-tv-wins-appeal-chris-697553 [hereinafter Lifetime TV Wins]. 
56 Ash, 843 N.Y.S.2d at 219 (citing Quattrone, 402 F.3d at 309). 
57 Quattrone, 402 F.3d at 309-10 (citing Neb. Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 559) (“[T]he elimi-
nation of prior restraints is the ‘chief purpose’ of the First Amendment.”). 
58 Id. at 310. 
59 Ariel L. Bendor, Prior Restraint, Incommensurability, and the Constitutionalism of 
Means, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 289, 298 (1999). 
60 4C N.Y. PRAC., Com. Litig. in New York State Courts § 97:6, n.2 (3d ed.). 
7
Nunez: Prior Restraint with the Right of Privacy
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2015
656 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 31 
misappropriation in unauthorized biographies and documentaries.61 
Prior restraints are highly disfavored among the courts.  The 
court considers prior restraints on speech to be the “least tolerable 
[of] infringement[s]” because they set out to do what the Framers 
sought to prevent—censorship by the government.62  Therefore, when 
issuing a judicial injunction to prevent speech, federal and New York 
State courts apply the same traditional preliminary injunction test and 
strict scrutiny standard.63 
Because the courts presume that a restraint on speech is un-
constitutional, the moving party has a heavy burden to prove that a 
judicial injunction is the clear choice.64  Likewise, in the context of a 
law or a regulation restricting speech, the government must meet the 
heavy burden of proving that the speech will “immediately and irrep-
arably create injury to the public . . . —not that such expression 
[alone] . . . will incite criminal acts in others.”65 
Further, federal courts apply an additional test to determine 
the justification of a TRO to prevent the press from publishing details 
of a public criminal trial.66  As a result of the added protection that 
speech receives when reporting on current events and the high public 
demand for “real person’s stories,” there is an increase of docudra-
mas and biographies at the expense of an individual’s privacy.67  
Consequently, a state’s attempt to protect an individual’s privacy may 
run afoul of the First Amendment resulting in an equity-balancing 
test that will usually tip in the defendant’s favor, which minimizes the 
plaintiff’s right to privacy, and in some cases, leads to injustice. 
V. THE FEDERAL APPROACH 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides individuals with the fundamental right to freedom of speech 
and the press.68  However, it is well established that the right is not 
 
61 See Hollander, supra note 2, at 135.  Prior restraint issues also arise in cases involving 
claims of copyright infringement.  See generally SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 
268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
62 Stuart, 427 U.S. at 559. 
63 See supra note 34; see also Hollander, supra note 2, at 138. 
64 Stuart, 427 U.S. at 558. 
65 Rockwell v. Morris, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25, 32 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1961). 
66 Stuart, 427 U.S. at 562-63. 
67 See Hollander, supra note 2, at 134. 
68 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
8
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absolute due to public policy concerns that may require the restriction 
of certain types of speech, such as defamation or obscenity.69  The 
federal courts apply the traditional preliminary injunction test and the 
strict scrutiny standard to prevent a prior restraint on speech.  Subse-
quently, the court engages in a balancing test to determine whether to 
uphold freedom of speech rights when in conflict with other rights.70  
Since the balance usually tips in favor of freedom of speech,71 the ag-
grieved party is left with no other option but to wait for the other par-
ty to exercise its freedom of expression and then sue civilly for mone-
tary damages.72  Although the wait-and-sue approach may have the 
effect of “chilling” speech, rather than “freezing” it, courts prefer 
subsequent civil or criminal proceedings instead of issuing prior re-
straints as the appropriate sanction.73 
Courts have held that prior restraints are especially serious 
when used to prevent the communication of news and commentaries 
on current events.  In Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart,74 the United 
States Supreme Court addressed whether a TRO, issued to protect the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment75 right, was an unconstitutional prior 
restraint on the news media’s First Amendment right.  After a 
citywide manhunt, Erwin Charles Simants was arrested and arraigned 
for murdering six members of the Henry Kellie family in a rural town 
 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.”). 
69 See Stuart, 427 U.S. at 590 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that obscene publications 
and incitements to acts of violence fall outside of First Amendment protections); see also 
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 65 (1963) (“[O]bscenity is not within the area 
of constitutionally protected speech or press.”). 
70 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 50, 331-39 (1983) (explaining that 
public policy concerns may require some rights to be restricted).  See generally Quattrone, 
402 F.3d 304; Stuart, 427 U.S. 539. 
71 Michael I. Meyerson, Rewriting Near v. Minnesota: Creating a Complete Definition of 
Prior Restraint, 52 MERCER L. REV. 1087, 1092 (2001) (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES, *151-52 (“The liberty of [speech] and the press is indeed essential to the 
nature of a free state.”)). 
72 See Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975) (“[A] free society prefers 
to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the law than to throttle them 
and all others beforehand.”) (emphasis added); CBS v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1318 (1994) 
(“Subsequent civil or criminal proceedings, rather than prior restraints, ordinarily are the ap-
propriate sanction for calculated defamation or other misdeeds in the First Amendment con-
text.”). 
73 Davis, 510 U.S. at 1317. 
74 427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
75 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.”). 
9
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of 850 people.76  Local newspapers and television stations quickly 
sought to cover the sensational story.77  Three days later, the County 
Attorney and the defendant’s attorney sought a TRO in the Lincoln 
County Court to prevent “prejudicial news, which would make it dif-
ficult . . . [to obtain] an impartial jury and . . . a fair trial.”78  On Oc-
tober 22, 1976, the court granted a broad restriction prohibiting eve-
ryone who was present during the preliminary hearing from releasing 
“any testimony given or evidence adduced.”79 
Several press associations and reporters petitioned to the state 
district court the following day to vacate the TRO.80  After conduct-
ing a hearing, the district court considered newspaper articles and the 
County Court judge’s testimony and substituted the County Court’s 
order with its own TRO.81  The court stated, “[b]ecause of the nature 
of the crimes charged in the complaint . . . there is a clear and present 
danger that pre-trial publicity could impinge upon the defendant’s 
right to a fair trial.”82 
Four days later, the press association and reporters appealed 
to the Nebraska Supreme Court.83  The court found that the district 
court acted properly in issuing the order because, as a result of the in-
tense pre-trial publicity, the defendant’s right to a fair trial and an 
impartial jury was in jeopardy.84  Further, the court noted that apart 
from the defendant, society had a vital interest in protecting that 
right.85  However, the court modified the district court’s TRO to in-
stead prohibit three subjects: (1) the defendant’s confession to law 
enforcement; (2) any third party confessions or admissions, except 
those statements made to the press; and (3) other facts “strongly im-
plicative of the accused.”86 
 
76 Stuart, 427 U.S. at 542. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. (emphasis added). 
80 Id. at 543. 
81 Stuart, 427 U.S. at 543-44.  The district court’s TRO prohibited the petitioners from 
reporting on five subjects: (1) the confession Simants made to law enforcement; (2) the 
statements Simants made to other persons; (3) the note Simants had written the night of the 
murder; (4) medical testimony; and (5) the identities of the victims and the nature of the 
crime. 
82 Id. at 543. 
83 Id. at 544. 
84 Id. at 545. 
85 Id. 
86 Stuart, 427 U.S. at 545. 
10
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In granting certiorari, the United States Supreme Court con-
sidered whether the First Amendment precluded a TRO issued to pro-
tect another equally important constitutional right, the Sixth Amend-
ment right to a fair trial.87  Specifically, the Court focused on the 
constitutionality of the Nebraska Supreme Court’s TRO.88  Histori-
cally, conflicts between First and Sixth Amendment rights were ob-
vious, yet the drafters never addressed how to relieve this tension.89  
Rather, the drafters were more concerned with preventing govern-
ment intrusion in the “political arena and the dialogue of ideas.”90 
Modern technology and the demand for sensational news sto-
ries, however, created a “carnival atmosphere” that almost always re-
sulted in a biased jury.91  As a result, voluntary standards were devel-
oped to impose responsibility on members of the press and the legal 
profession to prevent Sixth Amendment violations.92  Consequently, 
the Court acknowledged that a TRO was the Nebraska Supreme 
Court’s effort to accommodate the long-standing legitimate concern 
in protecting the defendant’s right to a fair trial.93 
Nevertheless, the Court explained that prior restraints are pre-
sumptively unconstitutional.94  With the heavy burden on the propo-
nent to prove justification of a prior restraint, it is especially difficult 
to justify when the prior restraint seeks to restrict “truthful reports,” 
such as “news and commentary on current events.”95  In balancing 
First and Sixth Amendment rights,96 the Court applied a three-prong 
test, commonly known as the Nebraska Press test, to determine 
 
87 Id. at 555-56. 
88 Id. at 546.  The Court noted that although Simants was convicted of murder and sen-
tenced to death, the issue was not moot and should nonetheless be addressed since it was 
“capable of repetition.”  Id. at 546-47. 
89 Id. at 547.  The Court discussed the tension between First and Sixth Amendment rights 
in the trial of British soldiers charged with homicide for shooting into a crowd, the trial of 
Aaron Burr, and trial of the abduction and murder of the Lindbergh baby.  Stuart, 427 U.S. at 
547-49. 
90 Id. at 547. 
91 Id. at 548-49. 
92 Id. at 549-50.  The American Bar Association adopted voluntary guidelines in 1965 in 
an attempt to balance First and Sixth Amendment rights.  Id. at 549.  In addition, members of 
the press adopted their own voluntary guidelines to deal with the reporting of crimes and 
criminal trials.  Stuart, 427 U.S. at 550-51. 
93 Id. at 550. 
94 Id. at 558. 
95 Id. at 558-59. 
96 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing trial by an impartial jury in federal criminal 
prosecutions). 
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whether the pre-trial record justified issuing a TRO.97  The test con-
siders: 
(1) the nature and extent of pre-trial news coverage; 
(2) whether other measures would be likely to mitigate 
the effects of unrestrained pre-trial publicity; and (3) 
how effectively a restraining order would operate to 
prevent the threatened danger.98 
In Stuart, the Court found no issue with the first prong of the test.  
The pre-trial record convinced the Court that the nature and extent of 
the pre-trial news coverage was intensive and likely to affect prospec-
tive jurors.99 
The Court, however, took issue with the second and third re-
quirements of the test.  The findings were insufficient to determine 
that the Nebraska Supreme Court considered alternative measures to 
prior restraint.100  The test requires the lower court to institute various 
alternatives to mitigate unrestrained pre-trial publicity short of an in-
junction, such as a change of trial venue, postponement of the trial, 
questioning prospective jurors about potential bias, providing clear 
jury instructions to narrow the scope of what the jury could decide, 
and limiting what court officers may say to anyone.101  Since the 
court failed to consider any of these alternatives, the second prong of 
the test was not met.102 
Lastly, in determining the effectiveness of the TRO in protect-
ing the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right, the Court acknowledged 
the problems that arise in managing and enforcing an injunction.103  
For example, territorial jurisdiction and lack of in personam jurisdic-
tion make enforcing a restraining order problematic because petition-
ers may not be within reach of the court, allowing them to simply ig-
nore the restraining order.104  Equally important, because of the 
difficulty of determining in advance what will be prejudicial pre-trial 
publicity, in issuing an injunction, the trial judge may create a “gray 
zone [where] circumstances may not violate the restrictive order and 
 
97 Stuart, 427 U.S. at 562. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 562-63. 
100 Id. at 565. 
101 Id. at 563-64. 
102 Stuart, 427 U.S. at 565. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 565-66. 
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yet be prejudicial.”105  Furthermore, sensational news stories are inev-
itable in a town of 850 people, where rumors spread quickly, inevita-
bly affecting possible jurors.106  For these reasons, the Court found 
that issuing the TRO would not have protected the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to a fair trial.107 
Moreover, the Court found the Nebraska Supreme Court’s 
TRO was too broad because it prohibited reporting any testimony or 
evidence in open court, which violates the well settled principle that 
“there is nothing that proscribes the press from reporting the events 
that transpire in the courtroom.”108  Ultimately, the respondent failed 
to meet the high barriers to prior restraints and the Court reversed the 
judgment.109 
Nearly forty years after Stuart, the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals in United States v. Quattrone110 similarly balanced the scales 
of equity between the plaintiff’s First Amendment right to freedom of 
speech and press and the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair 
trial, illustrating the long-standing difficulty in resolving these ten-
sions.111  The defendant, Frank Quattrone, was indicted for witness 
tampering and obstruction of justice in connection with an investiga-
tion related to the fraudulent practices of certain Wall Street invest-
ment-banking firms.112  After the defendant’s trial resulted in a hung 
jury, he was retried six months later.113  Shortly before his second tri-
al, the defendant requested that the judge empanel an “anonymous ju-
ry” in order to prevent a mistrial during this highly publicized and 
controversial trial.114  The judge denied Quattrone’s request, but 
nonetheless ordered the press to refrain from publicly publishing any 
juror’s name.115 
The appellant media organization appealed the district judge’s 
order prohibiting the publication of jurors’ names.116  Ultimately, the 
 
105 Id. at 566-67. 
106 Id. at 567. 
107 Stuart, 427 U.S. at 567. 
108 Id. at 568. 
109 Id. at 570. 
110 Quattrone, 402 F.3d 304. 
111 Id. at 310-11. 
112 Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153, 161 (2d Cir. 2006). 
113 Quattrone, 402 F.3d at 307. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 308. 
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Second Circuit found that the district court failed to meet the required 
elements of the Nebraska Press test rendering the injunction uncon-
stitutional.117 The court began its discussion by acknowledging that 
freedom of speech is not absolute, and there are circumstances where 
trial news coverage must be restricted in order to prevent a mistrial.118  
In those cases, the court must review the record, the “precise terms” 
of the TRO, and consider the Nebraska Press test.119 
First, the Second Circuit determined that the district court 
failed to examine whether extensive publicity would impair the de-
fendant’s Sixth Amendment right.120  Specifically, the judge admitted 
that Quattrone was not harassed in his first trial.121  Furthermore, the 
district court issued the restrictive order on incidents that occurred in 
an entirely separate and unrelated trial.122  Second, the district court 
failed to consider alternative measures to prior restraints.123  As dis-
cussed in Stuart, the district court could have changed the trial venue, 
postponed the trial, or sequestered the jury to mitigate the effects that 
trial publicity would have on Quattrone’s Sixth Amendment right to a 
fair trial.124  Third, the court found it significant that the restriction 
barred the petitioners from publicly publishing any juror names de-
spite their being read aloud in open court.125  Therefore, anyone pre-
sent in the courtroom would have known the jurors’ names, which 
would render the restrictive order unenforceable.126  Ultimately, the 
Second Circuit vacated the TRO as an unconstitutional prior restraint 
on speech.127 
The United States Supreme Court made it clear that a prior re-
straint is unconstitutional when issued to prevent the communication 
of news and commentaries in a public proceeding.128  However, the 
 
117 Id. at 312. 
118 Quattrone, 402 F.3d at 310. 
119 Id. at 311.  The Nebraska Press test considers: (1) whether the nature of the news cov-
erage in question would impair the defendant’s right to a fair trial; (2) whether measures oth-
er than a prior restraint on publication exist to mitigate the effects of unrestricted publicity; 
and (3) the likely efficacy of a prior restraint to prevent the threatened danger.  Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 311. 
122 Quattrone, 402 F.3d at 311. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 312. 
126 Id. 
127 Quattrone, 402 F.3d at 312. 
128 Id. at 308. 
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Court found the scales of equity continued to tip in favor of a media 
defendant’s First Amendment rights in communicating news of a pri-
vate facility, although it was obtained through “calculated mis-
deeds.”129  In CBS v. Davis,130 the Supreme Court considered whether 
an injunction prohibiting the broadcasting of a South Dakota meat-
packing factory’s unsanitary practices was a prior restraint on the pe-
titioner’s First Amendment right.131 
CBS News had obtained footage of the inner operations of a 
meatpacking plant through the use of a hidden camera, and sought to 
broadcast the videotape in an investigative news segment exposing 
unsanitary practices.132  As a result, the Federal Beef Processors, Inc. 
(“Federal”) sought an emergency TRO in the Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals to prevent the release of the footage on the ground that it 
would suffer irreparable economic harm.133  The Seventh Circuit 
agreed with Federal and granted the TRO by applying the traditional 
preliminary injunction test.134  Furthermore, the court held that the 
prior restraint doctrine was inapplicable because the appellant had 
obtained the footage through “calculated misdeeds.”135 
The United States Supreme Court disagreed with the Seventh 
Circuit.136  The Court found that the balance of equities did not clear-
ly weigh in Federal’s favor because more harm would come to CBS 
News if its First Amendment rights were violated.137  In addition, the 
United States Supreme Court stated that the wait-and-sue approach, 
rather than a prior restraint, was the appropriate sanction.138  The 
Court stated, “If CBS has breached its state law obligations, the First 
Amendment requires that Federal remedy its harms through a damag-
es proceeding rather than through suppression of protected 
 
129 Davis, 510 U.S at 1318. 
130 510 U.S. 1315 (1994). 
131 Id. at 1315. 
132 Id. at 1315-16. 
133 Id. at 1316. 
134 Id.  See supra note 34. 
135 Davis, 510 U.S. at 1316.  The Seventh Circuit determined that CBS News obtained 
footage through “calculated misdeeds” when it trespassed, breached a duty of loyalty, aided 
and abetted, and violated the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Comp. Laws Ann. § 37-39-1.  Id. 
136 Id. at 1318. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 1318 (“Subsequent civil or criminal proceedings, rather than prior restraints, or-
dinarily are the appropriate sanction for calculated defamation or other misdeeds in the First 
Amendment context.”). 
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speech.”139  As a result, the injunction was vacated.140 
Federal courts have remained consistent in their analytical 
framework to determine prior restraint issues in applying the tradi-
tional preliminary injunction test.141  When an injunction seeks to re-
strict speech, a federal court will presume that the injunction is un-
constitutional and place a heavy burden on the moving party to prove 
otherwise.  In addition, federal courts have afforded greater protec-
tion to speech that reports or publishes news and commentaries on 
public criminal trials.  Rather than issue an injunction, federal courts 
have preferred the wait-and-sue approach. 
VI. THE NEW YORK STATE APPROACH 
The New York State Constitution provides, “Every citizen 
may freely speak, write, and publish his or her sentiments on all sub-
jects . . . ; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty 
of the speech or of the press.”142  Although the New York State Con-
stitution affords more specific protection for speech and press, it fun-
damentally provides the same rights as the United States Constitu-
tion, and is therefore, applied similarly.143 
A. New York’s View of Prior Restraint 
Consistent with the federal approach, New York discourages 
censoring speech before its actual expression.  In their attempts to 
prevent an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech, New York 
courts generally apply the same traditional preliminary injunction test 
as the federal courts do, irrespective of their authority to do other-
wise.144  An injunction will be issued once the moving party is able to 
meet the strict scrutiny standard.145  However, similar to the federal 
courts, even if the standard could be met, New York courts remain 
 
139 Davis, 510 U.S. at 1318. 
140 Id. 
141 See supra note 34. 
142 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8 (McKinney 2014) (“Every citizen may freely speak, write and 
publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; 
and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.”). 
143 See People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 556, 560 (N.Y. 1986) (“Although State 
courts may not circumscribe rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, they may inter-
pret their own law to supplement or expand them.”). 
144 See supra Part IV for a discussion on prior restraints. 
145 Id. 
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reluctant, encouraging the wait-and-sue approach.146 
The prior restraint analysis, however, becomes problematic 
for a plaintiff who is alleging invasion of privacy due to an impend-
ing unauthorized biography or docudrama.  As a result, since New 
York courts do not recognize a common law right to privacy, the leg-
islature enacted a statute to narrowly protect that right.147  However, 
even in light of the narrow statute, vagueness on how and when the 
statute should be applied and the courts’ reluctance to issue an in-
junction have minimized privacy rights for public figures. 
B. New York’s Right of Privacy Statute 
New York State recognizes that although there may be legiti-
mate public curiosity about a public figure’s life, he or she may still 
have a right to privacy and its invasion may give rise to a cause of ac-
tion for an injunction and damages.148  New York Civil Rights Law 
section 51 provides injunctive relief to an individual who successful-
ly alleges the use of his or her “name, portrait, or voice . . . for adver-
tising purposes or for the purposes of trade without written con-
sent.”149  In addition, New York Civil Rights Law section 50 provides 
that it is a misdemeanor for “a person, firm, or corporation” to use a 
person’s name or likeness for purposes of trade without written con-
sent.150 
Although New York Civil Rights Law section 51 is consid-
ered a privacy statute, the term “privacy” is nowhere mentioned in 
the text.151  Instead, the statute is more concerned with protecting an 
individual’s name and picture from misappropriation in the commer-
cial context, such as for advertisement purposes.152  Throughout the 
years, New York courts have applied the statute broadly to remain 
consistent with its overall purpose, but this has raised constitutional 
 
146 Id. 
147 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 2009). 
148 Id. 
149 Id. (“Any person whose name, portrait, picture or voice is used within this state for ad-
vertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without . . . written consent . . . may maintain 
an equitable action . . . to prevent and restrain the use thereof.”). 
150 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 2009) (“[a] person, firm or corporation that 
uses for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of 
any living person without having first obtained . . . written consent . . . is guilty of a misde-
meanor.”). 
151 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 381 (1967). 
152 Id. 
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issues.153  Therefore, New York courts have limited the statute’s ap-
plication to avoid conflicts with a media organization’s freedom of 
commercial speech.154 
Courts have defined a public figure as someone who by his 
own voluntary efforts and through his “accomplishments, fame, or 
mode of living” has placed himself in the public eye.155  In addition, 
similar to Porco, a private person who does not voluntarily place 
himself in the public eye, but participates in a newsworthy event such 
as a highly publicized criminal trial, is considered a public figure un-
der the privacy statute.156  Therefore, the use of a criminal defend-
ant’s name or likeness is not considered for “purposes of trade”157 be-
cause his personal life has now become a matter of public record.158 
However, the newsworthy exception159 must involve matters 
of public interest by factually reporting on events and people; the ex-
ception does not protect fictional reporting.160  Ultimately, the statute 
provides very little protection to a public figure featured in a news-
worthy publication.161  This narrow exception recognizes the im-
portance of protecting freedom of speech rights under the New York 
State Constitution by balancing the important role of the news media 
with an individual’s privacy rights.162 
 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 382. 
155 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 410 (1960) (citing Cason v. 
Baskin, 30 So. 2d 635, 638 (Fla. 1947)). 
156 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 2009). 
157 Edme v. Internet Brands, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 2d 519, 528 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (defining 
“[p]urposes of trade” as “attract[ing] customers to the defendant or help[ing] the defendant 
make a profit.”). 
158 See generally Stuart, 427 U.S. 539. 
159 Internet Brands, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 2d at 528 (citing N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 
(McKinney 2014) (“The concept of ‘newsworthiness’ is applied broadly, and includes ‘not 
only descriptions of actual events, but also articles concerning political happenings, social 
trends or any subject of public interest.’ ”)). 
160 Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 221 N.E.2d 543, 545 (N.Y. 1966). 
161 See Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of Am., 103 N.E. 1108, 1110 (N.Y. 1913); Internet Brands, 
Inc., 968 F. Supp. 2d at 528-29 (citing Alfano v. NGHT, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 355, 359 
(E.D.N.Y. 2009)).  The New York Court of Appeals also acknowledged a second exception 
when there is no relationship between the use of plaintiff’s pictures to illustrate an article of 
public interest or if “the article is an advertisement in disguise.”  Internet Brands, Inc., 968 
F. Supp. 2d at 528-29 (quoting Messenger v. Gruner Jahr Printing & Publ’g, 727 N.E.2d 
549, 551 (2000)). 
162 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government 
for a redress of grievances.”); N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8 (McKinney 2014) (“Every citizen [has 
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In addition, New York Civil Rights Law section 51 is vague 
as to whether it authorizes a court to issue an injunction as an abso-
lute right to prevent the continued violation of the statute or whether 
the court must continue to apply the traditional preliminary injunction 
test.163  Or, in the alternative, even if an injunction is granted as an 
absolute right, the statute does not indicate when it shall be issued, 
whether before or after applying the traditional preliminary injunction 
test.164  Consequently, New York courts have conflicting interpreta-
tions of the statute.165 
Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc.166 illustrates a classic invasion 
of privacy issue for which the New York Civil Rights Law section 51 
provides a remedy.  The New York Court of Appeals considered 
whether an author and his publisher’s unauthorized biography about 
Warren Spahn, a famous professional left-handed pitcher, violated 
New York Civil Rights Law section 51 on the ground that the biog-
raphy was substantially fictitious.167 
The court affirmed the lower court’s decision because it found 
that the defendant had, in fact, violated New York Civil Rights Law 
section 51 by publishing a fictitious biography without the plaintiff’s 
prior written consent.168  The court discussed the statute’s purpose in 
protecting an individual’s picture or name from commercial exploita-
tion without his or her consent.169  Although New York courts applied 
the statute liberally to remain consistent with the legislative intent, 
they have limited the statute to protect First Amendment rights.170  
 
the right to] freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects . . . ; and no 
law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.”). 
163 See supra note 34. 
164 See supra note 7. 
165 See Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 258 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 
County 1984) (“Once the violation is established, the plaintiff may have an absolute right to 
injunction, regardless of the relative damage to the parties.”).  Not surprisingly, the vague-
ness of the statute has similarly caused a split in federal courts.  See Marshall v. Marshall, 
No. 08 CV 1420(LB), 2012 WL 1079550, at *30-31 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2012).  The court 
applied the traditional test to issue a preliminary injunction to be “both cautious and con-
sistent.”  But see ASA Music Prods. v. Thomsun Elecs., No. 96 Civ 1872 (BDP)(MDF) 1998 
WL 988195, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1998) (“Injunctive relief is mandated under Section 
51”). 
166 221 N.E.2d 543 (N.Y. 1966). 
167 Id. at 544. 
168 Id. at 546. 
169 Id. at 544. 
170 Id. at 544-45 (explaining that the legislative body intended to prohibit the use of a 
name or picture for “advertising purposes without his consent”). 
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Therefore, the statute’s remedy is limited to a voluntary or involun-
tary public figure whose life is of legitimate public interest and 
whose career depends on that publicity.171  However, although the 
law provides a public figure with very little professional privacy, that 
privacy is not completely lost.172  Specifically, fictional reporting of a 
newsworthy event or person is not an exception to the statute.173 
The defendant, author, Milton Shapiro (“Shapiro”), and his 
publisher, Julian Messner, Inc. (“Messner”), conceded that the biog-
raphy, The Warren Spahn Story, was largely fictionalized.174  How-
ever, they argued that such literary technique is customary in chil-
dren’s books to captivate a youthful audience; the biography “[had] 
to be a lively story.”175  Nevertheless, Shapiro and Messner failed to 
prove that they had done sufficient research on Spahn.176  Rather, 
Shapiro had derived most of his facts from inaccurate newspaper and 
magazine clippings.177 
Next, Shapiro and Messner argued that applying New York 
Civil Rights Law section 51 would “run afoul of the freedoms of 
speech and the press guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments of the Federal Constitution” because Spahn failed to establish 
that the fictionalized biography was created with knowledge of falsity 
or reckless disregard for the truth, as required by New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan.178  However, the court held that the test was inapplicable 
here because, contrary to New York Times Co., this case did not in-
volve public officials and the publication of official conduct.179  The 
court stated: 
The free speech, which is encouraged and essential to 
the operation of a healthy government, is something 
quite different from an individual’s attempt to enjoin 
 
171 Spahn, 221 N.E.2d at 544-45. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 545. 
174 Id. 
175 Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 233 N.E.2d 840, 843-43 (N.Y. 1967). 
176 Id. at 843 (stating “he never interviewed Mr. Spahn, any member of his family, or any 
baseball player who knew Spahn.  Moreover, the author did not even attempt to obtain in-
formation from the Milwaukee Braves, the team for which Mr. Spahn toiled for almost two 
decades.”). 
177 Id. 
178 Spahn, 221 N.E.2d at 545.  This standard was articulated by the United States Supreme 
Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
179 Id. 
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the publication of a fictitious biography of him.  No 
public interest is served by protecting the dissemina-
tion of the latter.  We perceive no constitutional infir-
mities in this respect.180 
Ultimately, the court affirmed the lower court’s decision to grant 
damages and an injunction because it found that the fictitious biog-
raphy was an unauthorized commercial exploitation of Spahn’s per-
sonality, which was prohibited by New York Civil Rights Law sec-
tion 51.181 
One year later, the New York Court of Appeals vacated the 
affirmance and reconsidered the appeal, after the United States Su-
preme Court’s decision in Time, Inc. v. Hill.182  There, the Court held 
that in order for New York’s privacy statute to be constitutional, a 
public figure who states a claim under section 51 must prove that the 
work was published with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard 
for the truth.183  After reconsidering Spahn, the New York Court of 
Appeals re-affirmed its previous order, finding that the unauthorized 
biography was published with knowledge of its falsity.184 
In like manner, the Supreme Court of New York County in 
Weil v. Johnson185 considered whether to issue an injunction prevent-
ing the release of a documentary that allegedly violated the plaintiff’s 
privacy rights under New York Civil Rights Law section 51.186  The 
defendant, heir to the Johnson & Johnson fortune, created a docu-
mentary following the lives of young people who had been born into 
wealth.187  The plaintiff, who was the heir to the Autotote fortune, 
had signed three different release forms to participate in the docu-
mentary, acknowledging that his name and likeness would be used in 
the film.188  The plaintiff subsequently sued the defendant, arguing 
that the release of the film would violate his privacy rights under 
 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 546. 
182 Spahn, 233 N.E.2d at 841. 
183 Id. at 842. 
184 Id. (finding “the defendants’ own admission that ‘in writing this biography, the author 
used the literary techniques of invented dialogue, imaginary incidents, and attributed 
thoughts and feelings’ clearly indicates that the . . . test has been met here.”). 
185 Weil v. Johnson, No. 119431/02, 2002 WL 31972157 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Sept. 27, 
2002). 
186 Id. at *3. 
187 Id. at *1. 
188 Id. 
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New York Civil Rights Law section 51 by portraying the plaintiff in 
an embarrassing light.189 
The court began its analysis by recognizing that although 
there is no common law right to privacy in New York, the 1903 Leg-
islature enacted Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 51 to protect that 
right.190  It held that the plaintiff’s claims did not meet the require-
ments of the statute because the plaintiff had signed three release 
forms to participate in the documentary, which in essence gave the 
defendant consent to use the plaintiff’s name and picture in connec-
tion with the documentary.191  However, assuming that the plaintiff 
was able to establish a claim under sections 50 and 51, the court 
found that the documentary fell within the newsworthy exception 
stating, “[i]ndeed, what the plaintiff seeks here is a prior restraint on 
defendant’s First Amendment right to distribute an informative socio-
logical documentary of considerable ‘public interest.’ ”192 
Further, the court held that since prior restraints are presump-
tively unconstitutional, in applying the traditional preliminary injunc-
tion test, the plaintiff would fail to demonstrate imminent danger or 
irreparable damage, other than embarrassing his family.193  Similar to 
the federal courts’ wait-and-sue approach, the New York Supreme 
Court explained that the plaintiff’s only option is to wait for the 
film’s release to sue civilly for monetary damages.194 
VII. DISCUSSION 
Porco v. Lifetime Entertainment Services, LLC raises serious 
questions on whether an involuntary public figure participating in a 
highly publicized criminal trial, may seek a TRO to preserve his or 
her limited right to privacy in an unauthorized biography or docu-
drama without violating the doctrine of prior restraint.  Based on the 
federal and New York courts’ analytical frameworks, it is unlikely 
that a judicial injunction will overcome the doctrine’s heavy burden. 
The federal courts’ analytical framework is clear and predict-
able.  In applying the Nebraska Press test, the Court in Stuart and 
 
189 Id. at *3. 
190 Weil, 2002 WL 31972157, at *3. 
191 Id. at *4. 
192 Id. at *5. 
193 Id. at *5. 
194 Weil, 2002 WL 31972157, at *5. 
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Quattrone determined that a highly publicized criminal defendant’s 
right to a fair trial did not clearly outweigh the opposing party’s First 
Amendment right to free speech.195  Further, in Davis, the Court re-
mained reluctant to enjoin an impending investigative news broadcast 
because it held that more harm would result from violating the media 
organization’s right to commercial speech.196  As a result, the TROs 
in Stuart, Quattrone, and Davis were vacated as unconstitutional pri-
or restraints on speech. 
However, contrary to federal law, New York State provides a 
narrow privacy statute, which seems to grant an injunction as an ab-
solute right.197  In applying New York Civil Rights Law section 51, 
New York State courts in Spahn found that the unauthorized biog-
raphy and documentary did not fall under the newsworthy exception 
to the statute.198  For that reason, the plaintiff in Spahn succeeded in 
obtaining an injunction because the purported biography was substan-
tially fictional.199  Nevertheless, the court continued to apply the tra-
ditional preliminary injunction test to reach its ultimate decision, 
even though the statute seems to authorize an injunction as of right.200 
As a result of the statutes’ vagueness on the issue of the ap-
plicability of the traditional preliminary injunction test, inconsistent 
applications of the statute can result in injustice for a public figure.201  
A court that is reluctant to issue an injunction as of right, but applies 
the traditional preliminary injunction test to balance the equities is ul-
timately minimizing the public figure’s limited right to privacy, be-
cause the scales will usually tip in the defendant’s favor. 
New York Civil Rights Law section 51 should be amended 
with clear language as to whether the statute authorizes an injunction 
without balancing the equities.  Alternatively, when a court under-
takes a balancing test between the defendant’s freedom of speech and 
a public figure’s right to privacy, it could distinguish between com-
mercial and non-commercial speech to avoid minimizing a public 
figure’s privacy right.  For example, as the plaintiff in Spahn pre-
vailed in seeking to enjoin commercial speech, a plaintiff should sim-
 
195 See Stuart, 427 U.S. at 570; see also Quattrone, 402 F.3d at 313-14. 
196 See Davis, 510 U.S. at 1318. 
197 See discussion supra Part VI.B. 
198 See Spahn, 221 N.E.2d at 545; see also Weil, 2002 WL 31972157, at *5. 
199 Spahn, 221 N.E.2d at 546. 
200 See discussion supra Part VI.B. 
201 Onassis, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 258 (“Once the violation is established, the plaintiff may 
have an absolute right to injunction, regardless of the relative damage to the parties.”). 
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ilarly prevail because the statute’s purpose outweighs the defendant’s 
first amendment right to freedom of commercial speech.202  On the 
other hand, if the alleged infringement is non-commercial speech or 
falls within an exception, as in Weil, the defendant should prevail 
against an injunction—with the wait-and-sue approach as an op-
tion.203 
Under this proposed solution, the holding in Porco v. Lifetime 
Entertainment Services, LLC would yield the same result.  The Ap-
pellate Division would have identified Porco’s alleged violation to 
his privacy as commercial speech.  However, the docudrama, Romeo 
Killer, would have continued to fall within the statute’s newsworthy 
exception rendering the TRO as an unconstitutional prior restraint on 
Lifetime’s freedom of speech.  Ultimately, Porco’s right to sue civilly 
for monetary damages would remain upon the film’s broadcast. 
However, this proposed solution might continue to impose an 
unconstitutional prior restraint on an individual’s freedom of speech.  
Therefore, clarifying New York’s privacy statute is the best recourse 
to prevent conflicting interpretations. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The federal and New York approaches reflect the importance 
of the doctrine of prior restraint.  Although there is no federal right of 
privacy, a federal court’s preliminary injunction analysis is con-
sistent, favoring freedom of speech rights and preferring the wait-
and-sue approach.204  Conversely, New York State recognizes that 
protecting an individual’s right to privacy is extremely important, but 
not at the cost of restricting an individual’s free speech.  Instead, sim-
ilar to federal courts, New York prefers the wait-and-sue approach. 
Nonetheless, section 51 seemingly grants an injunction to nar-
rowly protect a public figure’s privacy.205  As a result of the statute’s 
vagueness, the courts continue to apply the standard preliminary in-
junction test to prevent an unconstitutional prior restraint when the 
statute authorizes otherwise.206  What results is a vexing situation for 
an individual who fears that a purported biography or docudrama will 
 
202 Spahn, 221 N.E.2d at 546. 
203 See Weil, 2002 WL 31972157. 
204 See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
205 See supra note 147. 
206 See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
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unfairly expose harmful and dramatized details about his or her life—
the individual has no choice but to wait and sue.  At this time, alt-
hough New York’s privacy statute should be amended to provide 
clearer interpretation, the wait-and-sue approach, or a subsequent 
criminal or civil sanction, is the only appropriate option to reconcile 
freedom of speech rights with privacy rights.  This analysis could at-
tempt to balance the doctrine of prior restraint with the right to priva-
cy and support the long-standing principle that freedom of speech is a 
fundamental constitutional right in the United States and any attempt 
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